Assessment Of Revenue And Expenditure Patterns In Urban Local Bodies Of Maharashtra by Ajit Karnik et al.
ASSESSMENT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE







Dr. Vibhooti Shukla Unit in Urban Economics
& Regional Development
WORKING PAPER NO. 5Assessment of Revenue And Expenditure Patterns In Urban
Local Bodies Of Maharashtra
Abhay Pethe *, Ajit Karnik* & Dilip Karmarkar#
ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned with respect to asses the revenue and
expenditure patterns in the various Urban Local  Bodies(ULBs) in
Maharashtra. The context for this is the finance commissions at the
state and central levels as well as the 74
th constitutional amendment.
Without the requisite resources, the de jure transfer of functions to
ULBs will be a vacuous exercise with no de facto change. Whilst
looking at the aggregate picture is fine, here we look also at the sub-
categories of Municipal Corporations and Councils separately. In
addition, we also consider the aspect of the quality of service delivery
by the corporations. To meaningfully operationalize the spirit and
letter of 74
th CAA, it is necessary that ULBs come out with a serious
and innovative action plan to increase their resources. The paper also
provides a fairly comprehensive status report on the different aspects
related to – revenue expenditure patterns – ULBs in Maharashtra. For
the purposes of accountability as well as evaluation, such an exercise
is useful as a foundational building block that needs to be replicated
across states.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Department of  Economics, University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Mumbai 400 098.
akarnik@excite.com and abhaypethe@excite.com
# Rural Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, Mantralaya, Mumbai
400 001. dkarmarkar@indiatimes.com 1
Assessment of Revenue And Expenditure Patterns In Urban
Local Bodies Of Maharashtra
Abhay Pethe, Ajit Karnik & Dilip Karmarkar
1. INTRODUCTION
The main thrust of this paper is to closely examine the expenditure and
revenue patterns of ULBs in Maharashtra. This needs to be contextualized within the
parameters set by the devolution patterns to local bodies that have been envisaged by
Central and State Finance Commissions on one hand and the 74
th Constitution
Ammendment on the other. Given the domestic macroeconomic situation that Indian
economy is faced with (partly externally and partly policy induced) the scarcity of
resources at all levels of government has to be recognized as a stark reality. Of course,
the funds flowing from higher level goverments are not the only ones available to
ULBs. ULBs have revenue generation powers of their own and a measure of
sustainablility and efficiency of local bodies is how well these match up with their
functions. Without this, the de jure transfer of functions to ULBs will be a vacuous
exercise with no de facto change. In this article however, we will not be discussing
the important issues connected with the devolution formulae (See Karnik and Pethe
2001 for details specific to Maharshtra) or alternative sources of revenue in any detail.
Such a discussion will be a subject fit for a separate paper. Comprehensive treatment
of these matters is  available to the interested reader in our UNDP/UNCHS study
(Karnik et al 2002a).
This paper is specifically meant to be a status report and contains also a proto
type exercise that may be gainfully replicated for other states. While the aggregate of
ULBs provides a picture of their expenditure and income patterns, it is important to
have a disaggregted look at select ULBs. In pursuit of this we studied the finances of
three MCs in Maharashtra – Navi Mumbai, Pimpri-Chinchwad and Thane (again,
details may be gleaned from Karnik et al 2002a). Bearing in mind that expenditures
by ULBs represent only the input side of the process of service delivery, we seek to 2
have a look at the output side as well viz., actual service delivery to the citizens of
these local bodies.
The plan of this paper/article is as follows. In the next section we would
briefly comment about the heterogenity about the ULBs in Maharashtra. Section 3
looks at the powers and responsibilities of ULBs with respect to taxation and
expenditures. Section 4 presents an evaluation of ULBs in Maharashtra; this is done
separetely for Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils. Section 5 concludes.
2. URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN MAHARASHTRA
  The heterogeneity among the ULBs in Maharashtra begins from the variety of
Acts that govern them (A detailed listing of all ULBs in Maharashtra is given in
Appendixes 1 and 2). Unlike other States, where all the ULBs are governed by an
uniform act, ULBs in Maharashtra are governed by the following four Acts:
￿  Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888,
￿  City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948,
￿  Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949,
￿  Maharashtra Municipal  Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965.
  Even though the above Acts have gradually evolved in response to felt needs,
it is now that a need to have an uniform Act governing all the ULBs
in the State is being recognized. This is especially true in the light of the
74th Constitutional Amendment Act, Schedule 12 which lists out numerous functional
responsibilities for ULBs in addition to those which were already being performed.
Consequently, State Acts, particularly those aspects relating to obligatory and
discretionary functions, need to be appropriately modified to reflect the spirit of the
Constitutional Amendments.
The broad division of Local Bodies in Maharashtra, as in other States, is
between Rural Local Bodies ( RLBs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs).
The main unit of governance at the rural level is the Gram  Panchayat (GP). The 3
graduation of GP to the smallest ULB, the ‘C’ Class Municipal Council (MC–C), is
possible when the population of a jurisdiction exceeds a critical level. However, in
some cases an intermediate stage has been imposed in Maharashtra between the GP
and MC–C. This is known as the Town Panchayat. As the name suggests, this is a
ULB in the making, which has not yet lost its rural moorings.
In the class of Municipal Councils there are two other levels of
ULBs: ‘B’ Class Municipal Council (MC–B) and ‘A’ Class Municipal Council (MC–
A). The parameters for classification of ULBs have been listed in Section 11 of
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965. It is seen that population is the only criteria for classification.
TABLE 2.1
CATEGORISATION OF ULBs AS PER POPULATION
Population ULB
Below 25,000   No Municipal Council
Between 25,001 and 40,000   ‘C’ Class Municipal Councils
Between 40,001 and  1,00,000   ‘B’ Class Municipal Councils
Between 1,00,001 and 3,00,000   ‘A’ Class Municipal Councils
Above 3,00,001   Municipal Corporations.
In addition, there are different norms for ‘Town  Panchayats’ and ‘Industrial
Townships’. An urban area with a population in between 15,000 and 25,000 is
declared as Town Panchayat, if the majority of workers are engaged in agricultural
activities. There are only two Town  Panchayats in Maharashtra and no Industrial
Townships.
We will present some summary statistics to convey a flavour of the
heterogeneity among ULBs. The heterogeneity of ULBs within each class with
respect to population (1991 Census) and area is shown in Table 2.2. 4
TABLE 2.2
CHARACTERISTICS OF ULBs IN MAHARASHTRA
Characteristic Statistic MC MC–A MC–B MC–C
Mean 12.89 1.91 0.58 0.21
Standard Deviation 24.19 0.86 0.14 0.08
C.V. 1.88 0.45 0.25 0.39
Maximum 99.1 3.79 0.88 0.42
Population
(lakhs)
Minimum 3.14 0.95 0.37 0.03
Mean 186.49 26.42 15.92 14.14
Standard Deviation 152.94 20.05 11.45 19.17
C.V. 0.82 0.76 0.72 1.36
Area
(sq. km.)
Maximum 603.0 81.64 47.26 152.81
Minimum 13.34 3.94 2.54 0.67
Correlation 0.8227 0.1836 0.0541 0.0478
Notes:
C.V. = Coefficient of Variation
Correlation has been computed between population and area for each class of ULB.
If one merely considers the means of population or area the movement from MC–C to
MC seems gradual: MC–C has the lowest mean population and mean area followed
by MC–B, then by MC–A and finally MC. However, there are wide variations within
each level of ULB, with those for area being much greater than those for population.
For instance, the minimum size of an MC–C is 0.67 square  kilometers while the
maximum size is 152.81 square kilometers, which is much larger than the largest
MC–A or MC–B. One further indicator of the heterogeneity is the correlation between
area and population for each class of ULB. The correlation is the highest for MC at
0.823 and the lowest for MC–C at 0.048.
3. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ULBs
Before we begin our study of the expenditure and revenue profiles of ULBs in
Maharashtra we felt it would be better to examine their powers and responsibilities
with respect to their taxation and expenditure functions. This would form the
backdrop against which we shall be evaluating the functioning of the ULBs with
respect to their revenue-expenditure patterns and service delivery performance. 5
The operations of ULBs are governed by various provisions in the State Acts
which are the fountainhead of the powers of local bodies. The sources of revenue are
mandated by such provisions and their autonomy in taxation is circumscribed by
these. Similarly, their autonomy for deciding expenditure priorities is limited within
this framework. Hence it is essential to understand the provisions in the State Acts
regarding the revenues and expenditure powers of the ULBs.
3.1. Revenues of ULBs in Maharashtra: Taxation Powers of ULBs
Revenues of ULBs can be broadly classified as revenues from own sources
and those from external sources, such as grants from the State and loans. Again, own
sources of revenues can be categorized as tax revenues and non tax revenues. There
are specific provisions in the State Acts, regarding taxation powers of the ULBs.
Article 243X of the Constitution, inserted after the 74th Constitutional Amendment
Act (CAA) envisages, that States should devolve additional taxation powers to ULBs,
so as to make them financially competent for discharging the added functional
responsibilities, mandated by the succeeding Article 243W. However, in Maharashtra,
there has been no such devolution of taxation powers, which would have been
expected since it would have been in consonance with the process of decentralization.
Instead, we have seen that taxation powers of small ULBs regarding octroi have been
withdrawn by the State in March 1999. Hence, the taxation powers of the ULBs are
limited to its traditional sphere and have not gone beyond various existing provisions
in the State Acts.
Section 139 of the BMC Act 1888, Section 127 of the BPMC Act 1949 and
Section 108 of the Councils Act 1965, provides taxation powers of the ULBs
regarding following items.
a)  Octroi or Cess on lieu of octroi (Note: This is only for municipal corporations)
b)  Property Tax
c)  Vehicle tax, tax on boats or animals
d)  Sanitary tax upon private latrines cleaned by municipal agency
e)  Drainage tax 6
f)  Water tax
g)  Educational tax
  Thus the above list delimits the tax powers of ULBs. However, even within
this list there are provisions in the State Acts that further reduce the flexibility of the
ULBs. This can be illustrated by property tax.
Municipal Corporations (MCs) in Maharashtra can levy property tax as a
percentage of annual ratable value of the property, and ceilings for such percentages
are laid down by the State in three different Acts. They are summarized in Table 3.1.
  TABLE 3.1
  RATES OF PROPERTY TAX IN MCs OF MAHARASHTRA
Components of Property Tax BMC Act
1888
NMC Act
1948 BPMC Act 1949
General Tax 26 % 12 % to 31% Maximum 12 %
Fire Brigade Tax 4 % 1 % Maximum 12 %
Water Tax 65 % 10 % to 15 % Autonomy of the ULB
Water benefit tax 12.50 % -- Autonomy of the ULB
Sewerage Tax 39 % 12 % Autonomy of the ULB
Sewerage benefit Tax 7.50 % -- Autonomy of the ULB
Education Tax 12 % 2 % to 12 % Upto 5 %
Street Tax 15 %  -- Maximum 10 %
BMC=Bombay Municipal Corporation
NMC = Nagpur Municipal Corporation
BPMC=Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation
 
  It can be seen that BMC has no autonomy regarding the components and rate
for each component of the tax, while Nagpur has limited autonomy. All other MCs
(governed by BPMC Act) have autonomy regarding the rate of tax in case of
components related to water supply and sewerage only. However, there is no freedom
to any MC regarding inclusion of any new component or changing the tax base to 7
some other, say, area. In the case of Municipal Councils, property tax is levied as a
consolidated property tax, but different ceilings for tax rate, as a percentage of the
annual ratable value, are similarly prescribed by the State vide provisions in
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965. These ceiling are listed in Table 3.2.
  TABLE 3.2
RATES OF PROPERTY TAX IN MUNICIPAL COUNCILS OF
MAHARASHTRA
Type of Municipal Council Minimum Maximum
A 23 % 28 %
B 22 % 27 %
C 21 % 26 %
  Systematic information is not available for the rate of property tax being
actually levied by various municipal councils. Hence we are unable to report details in
this regard. However, we believe that many of them have reached or are close to the
limit set by the various Acts.
It is clear from the above discussion, that ULBs have a very limited choice
regarding taxation, which is further restricted by various regulating principles decided
by the State. Even though it is true, that the higher level government should play a
supervising and controlling role, the restrictions imposed on ULBs seem to be
suffocating them. The important point being made here is, that ULBs have a very
limited autonomy about the sources of their revenues, and the entire revenue-
expenditure process needs to be assessed bearing this in mind.
3.2. Revenues of ULBs in Maharashtra: Non Tax Revenues
Like taxation, the non tax revenues of the ULBs are also limited to
conventional sources such as:
a.  Parking fees
b.  Permit fees
c.  Service fees and user charges
d.  Rent from buildings and commercial complexes 8
e.  Development fees for granting permission to construct buildings on vacant plot
f.  Other fees and charges etc.
The power of ULBs in Maharashtra appear to be highly restricted with respect
to both, the tax and the non tax sources of revenues, which constitute their  own
sources. This has forced the ULBs to be dependent on the State for their finances.
These constitute external sources of finance, which complement the own sources of
ULBs.
3.3. Grants from State
The external sources of revenues for the ULBs are grants from the State. There
are about thirty types of grants flowing towards the ULBs under different major and
minor heads in the State budget. Important among them, with their characteristics, are
as follows:
￿  Dearness Allowance Grant:  This grant is given to municipal councils for
compensating the expenditure incurred for dearness allowance payable to
municipal staff. This grant is linked to the recovery of property tax in the previous
year.
TABLE 3.3
  DISTRIBUTION OF DEARNESS ALLOWANCE GRANT
Recovery of Property Tax Admissible Grant
Upto 60 % 70 %
From 61 % to 70 % 80 %
From 71 % to 85 % 85 %
Above 85 % 100 %
 
  There are upper limits as well for the grant receivable from the State, as a
percentage of the expenditure on dearness allowance. The limits are as follows:
 
  9
  TABLE 3.4
  LIMITS FOR DEARNESS ALLOWANCE GRANT





  This is, perhaps, a strange case, where the principle of incentives is applied for
the basic receivable by any employee, that is the component of the salary. Further, the
ULB has to initially pay the amount to the staff, and then gets compensation in due
course, adversely affecting its liquidity position. If a ULB receives lower allocation
due to non performance, the ULB gets penalized, and not the concerned staff in
taxation wing, as there may not be any deductions in dearness allowance paid to them.
￿  Grant for reimbursement of salary and leave salary of Chief Officers: Salaries and
leave salaries of chief officers are compensated by the State, since chief officers
are employees of the State and not of the ULB.
￿  Land revenue and non agriculture assessment grant: ULBs receive 75 percent of
the land revenue and 75 percent of the non agriculture revenue collected in their
area by the State.
￿  Entertainment Grant: This grant, again linked to the recovery of consolidated
property tax, is received by the ULBs in proportion to the entertainment tax
recovered from their respective areas on the basis of following formula.
TABLE 3.5
RATES OF ENTERTAINMENT TAX GRANT
Type of the ULB Entertainment Tax Grant (% of collection)
Municipal Corporations 10 %
A Class Councils 50 %
B Class Councils 70 %
C Class Councils 90 % 10
￿  Stamp Duty Grant: 1 percent of the value of the sale, or mortgage deed in the area
of the ULB is given out of the stamp duty collected by the State.
￿  Pilgrim Tax Grant: Six municipal councils which were places of pilgrimage
(Trimbak, Alandi, Jejuri, Pandharpur, Tuljapur and Ramtek) were levying pilgrim
tax, which was abolished by the State. Even though these councils, are
compensated like octroi, this again, can be cited as a centralizing tendency of the
State.
￿  Minor Mineral Grant: Only C class municipal councils receive this grant, to
enhance their  meager  resources  for  excavation of minor minerals in their
jurisdiction.
￿  Profession Tax Grant: In Maharashtra unlike in any other States, profession tax is
being levied by the State since 1975, and not by local bodies. A few ULBs levied
this tax before 1975, but their taxation powers on this score were withdrawn by
the State, and now they receive a compensation for it.
￿  Road Grant: Motor vehicle tax collected within the jurisdiction of an ULB is
shared at the rate of 17.75 percent of the net collection. BMC, which used to
collect wheel tax, is now prohibited from collecting it since is now being
compensated by this grant.
￿  Octroi Compensation Grant: Since octroi has been abolished from council areas,
Municipal Councils are now compensated by this grant.
￿  Primary Education Grant:There are different criteria for each type of ULB about
disbursement of this grant. BMC gets 20 percent of the expenditure on primary






  TABLE 3.6
  PRIMARY EDUCATION GRANT TO MUNICIPAL COUNCILS IN
MAHARASHTRA
Type of Municipal Council Grant Receivable
A Class 80 percent of the expenditure
B Class 90 percent of the expenditure
C Class 100 percent of the expenditure
￿  Other Grants: Apart from the above, there are some other grants - like grants for
traffic signals, for catching street dogs, for bleaching powder in water supply
schemes etc.
The following observations may be made about the external revenues of the
ULBs that have been discussed above:
￿  All grants are purposive in nature; that is, there are no untied type of grants. The
purposes for which these grants are disbursed do not consider assets for
infrastructure developments.
￿  Many grants (octroi, profession tax, pilgrim, road etc.) are  compensatory in
nature. Those grants are given subsequent to withdrawal of respective taxation
powers of the ULBs, indicating the centralizing tendencies of the State. In fact,
proper revenue-assignment dictates that taxes, which are local in nature, should be
levied by local authorities and not by the State.
￿  The distributive principles are not uniform. It is not the case that all ULBs receive
all types of grants and each type of grant is often disbursed at varying rates to
different ULBs.
￿  The nature of disbursements grants is purely ad hoc without any legitimate right
of the ULB. This affects the planning of expenditure strategies by the ULBs.
In conclusion we might state that grants from the State do not really help the
ULBs in major developmental works, but merely support their day-to-day
functioning. But more generally, revenues of the ULBs have been throtled by such 12
inherent structural bottlenecks like, limited autonomy regarding taxation, small
bandwidth for non tax revenues, unpredictable nature of funds flowing from the State
etc. It is important to remember these handicaps faced by ULBs while evaluating their
revenue patterns.
3.4. Expenditures of ULBs in Maharashtra
Expenditures by ULBs are basically for providing various services to citizens.
The 74th CAA has added a list of 18 services to be performed by local bodies.
However, since Maharashtra have a long tradition of ULBs even before its
Constitutional recognition by the 74th CAA, many of the functions listed in the
Twelfth Schedule were already being performed by them, and ULBs were incurring
expenses on these.
There are four State Acts governing ULBs in Maharashtra. Sections of those
Acts, which describe the duties and responsibilities of the ULBs, or the items on
which the ULBs are expected to spend, are as follows:
  TABLE 3.7




Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar
Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965 (Councils Act 1965)
Section 49(2) Section 49(3)
2 Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888
(BMC Act 1888) Section 61 Section 63
3 Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948
(NMC Act 1948) Section 57 Section 58
4 Bombay Provincial Municipal
Corporation Act, 1949 (BPMC Act 1949) Section 63 Section 66
 
  Some of the duties performed by ULBs are obligatory in nature, while others,
being discretionary, are within the autonomy of the ULB. The following is a list of
select important obligatory functions, that are traditionally performed by all ULBs. 13
1.  Public hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination, epidemic control and prevention of
dangerous diseases, medical relief, family planning and welfare etc.
2.  Removing dangerous buildings etc.
3.  Solid Waste Management
4.  Drainage and sewerage systems
5.  Water supply
6.  Roads, markets, slaughter houses, washing places, drinking fountains, tanks, wells,
etc.
7.  Fire Brigade
8.  Street Lights
9.  Disposal of dead bodies
10. Regulating and preventing offensive and dangerous trades or practices
11. Removing enchrochement on Government properties
12. Registering of births and deaths
13. Primary Schools
14. Welfare measures for scheduled castes and tribes, etc.
15. Establishing and maintaining relief work in times of scarcity or for destitute
persons residing within Municipal limits
  Similarly, the list of a few important discretionary functions is as follows:
1.  Public hospitals and homes for destitute and disabled persons
2.  Grants and donations to privately run primary and secondary schools
3.  Treatment of sewerage and waste
4.  Town halls, shops, Dharmashalas, open air theaters, stadiums, rest houses
5.  Transport
6.  Electricity and LPG supply 14
7.  Ceremonies, fairs, exhibitions etc.
8.  Destroy harmful animals
9.  Grazing ground, dry farm etc.
10. Welfare of municipal employees
11. Sanitary dwellings for the poor
12. Educational institutions
13. Dairies
After the 74th CAA, the following six entries from the Twelfth Schedule have
been added to the above described functional domain of the ULBs vide a State
enactment in 1994, which modified the provisions in the four above mentioned Acts.
1.  Planning for economic and social development (obligatory)
2.  Urban forestry, protection of the environment and promotion of the ecological
aspects (obligatory)
3.  Slum improvement and upgradation (discretionary)
4.  Urban poverty alleviation (discretionary)
5.  Cattle pounds and prevention of cruelty to animals (discretionary)
6.  Regulation of slaughter houses and tanneries (discretionary)
However, in spite of such functional devolution to the ULBs, it has not been
matched by supporting financial devolution. This has lead to too many responsibilities
chasing a narrow resource base. This is further aggravated by the stipulation in the
Municipal Acts that ULBs must balance their budgets. The plethora of contraints on
the ULBS has made assessment of their functioning difficult: it is difficult to establish
whether non-performance represents dereliction of duty or inability to perform due to
lack of funds. It has also compelled local authorities to be ‘creative’ in their disclosure
of information and in their accounting. The generally observed phenomenon that
quality of administration tends to be relatively poor at lower levels of government has
added to the difficulties: funds are utilized for non-productive purposes resulting in 15
poor delivery of services. The end result is a general apathy towards the functioning
of ULBs and little hope for any improvement. Naturally, citizens’ participation has
been conspicuous by its absence not only in Maharashtra but indeed all over India.
4. EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE
PATTERN OF ULBs IN MAHARASHTRA
4.1. An Examination of Expenditure Patterns of All Municipal Corporations
in Maharashtra
This section looks at the financial performance of all Municipal Corporations
in the state of Maharashtra. Our approach is to examine the quality of service delivery
by the corporations. This can be done by examining the finances of the corporations
and trying to identify patterns with respect to various expenditure heads. We do this
specifically to isolate expenditures on provision of important services to citizens
within the jurisdiction of the corporations. It should also be remembered that the
entire exercise of evaluation is on the backdrop of process of decentralisation that
accelerated after the 74
th Constitutional Amendment Act.
The main economic argument in favour of decentralisation is in terms of
allocative efficiency. The public sector is best suited to provide goods and services,
which have ‘public goods’ characteristics. A public good (to be distinguished for a
publicly produced good) has the following characteristics:
Non-Exclusion (NE): Difficulty of excluding a person who does not pay from the
benefits of the good or service.
Joint Consumption (JC): The availability of the benefits of the good to more than one
individual at the same time.
The classic example is national defence. No individual can be excluded from
the benefits of national defence by making enjoyment of benefits contingent on
payment. Further, adding one more beneficiary to the services provided by national
defence does not involve any additional cost. 16
However, not all public goods are characterized by NE and JC to the same
extent (Oates 1972, 1999). For instance, it may be possible to restrict the use of
flyover only to those who pay a toll (thus NE characteristic does not hold), but JC
(provided congestion does not set in) is still possible. Further, the benefits of certain
public goods are spatially restricted.
The spatial dimension of a public good adds force to the case for
decentralisation. Street lighting in Bombay will benefit only residents of Bombay but
not the residents of, say, Amravati. Further, the preferences of different localities for
public goods may differ substantially. Residents of a remote village may not be as
concerned about vehicular pollution (that is, demand clean air, which, in a small town,
is plentiful) as might the residents of an urban area (where clean air may be in short
supply).
Centralized provision of public goods will in all likelihood ignore the spatial
characteristics of these goods as well as the diversity of preferences. The inability of a
central body to account for spatial differences is essentially one of information. Local
bodies will be better informed about the characteristics of their localities and about
the preferences of their citizens. A centralized government, in the absence of this
information, will adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach and supply a uniform package of
public goods to all citizens. When the jurisdiction that determines the level of
provision of each public good includes precisely those individuals who consume the
good there is ‘perfect correspondence’ in the provision of public goods. Of course,
given the wide diversity of preferences of individuals, the number of jurisdictions that
will map all of these preferences precisely is likely to be very large. The situation
would get even more complicated as the number of public goods consumed by
individuals increases. It seems inconceivable that individuals living in close vicinity
of each other that is in a jurisdiction, would have the same preferences over all public
goods. Hence, individuals would have to be members of different jurisdictions at the
same time to have their needs for public goods to be perfectly satisfied. Clearly, the
latter would be an impossibility even assuming complete mobility of individuals. In
spite of these conceptual difficulty, the fact remains that local governments being
‘closer’ to consumers would satisfy preferences of consumers better than a central 17
government in the provision of public goods with spatial benefits. In fact, this is the
implication of the Decentralisation Theorem (Oates, 1972), which states that unless
there are significant cost-savings from centralized provision of public goods (which
there would be only for pure public goods), decentralized provision will always be
Pareto-improving.
Core Services as defined by Eleventh Finance Commission
The  Eleventh Finance Commission has defined  core services as being
inclusive of water, streetlights, roads and sanitation. The expenditure of all
corporations on the EFC core services as ratio of total expenditure was 35.87 percent
in 1995-6 (Table 4.1).
  TABLE 4.1
EXPENDITURE HEADS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE
           (%)
1995 – 6 1996 – 7 1997 - 8 1998 – 9 1999 – 2000
EFC Core Services
(water, street lights, roads,
sanitation /total exp)
35.87 38.71 38.85 38.75 39.18
Local Public Good
sanitation, fire brigade, roads,
st. lighting/total exp






46.02 48.14 48.47 47.49 48.65
General Administration,
Salaries, Pension etc 40.16 37.11 38.66 36.83 37.93
Education, Libraries,
Free Reading Halls etc. 4.29 4.01 3.96 3.45 3.86
Sanitation, Solid Waste
Management etc. 12.07 14.29 14.01 12.90 13.69
Fire Brigade 0.61 0.51 0.57 0.47 0.58
Water Supply 12.34 12.83 13.53 14.12 14.06
Epidemics and
Public Health
5.25 4.91 5.10 4.82 5.04
Roads 8.61 8.64 8.67 9.04 8.81
Street Lighting 2.85 2.94 2.64 2.68 2.62 18
A very gradually increasing trend is noticed in the proportion of expenditure
being incurred on the core services with the exception of a 0.1 percentage point
reduction in 1998-9. In 1999-2000 the ratio stood at 39.18 percent.
Local Public Goods
While provision of core services is a useful way of looking at the performance
of MCs, the term ‘core services’ does not have a precise connotation in economics. A
more precise and sound theoretical concept is that of local public goods (LPG), the
benefits of such public goods which are spatially restricted are known as LPG. LPG
shares the characteristic of NE with public goods. For instance, no ULB makes
provision of streetlights contingent on payment. However, the number of beneficiaries
cannot be increased indefinitely: at some point, an individual reasonably far away
from the street light will not receive any benefits at all. The benefits are restricted by
considerations of space in a way that benefits of public goods are not: the benefits of
defence expenditures are available to any individual, located anywhere in India.
With this definition of Local Public Goods being modified, water (which can
be metered and charged) is excluded and fire brigade is included. We now find that
the proportion of expenditure being incurred on these services is lower than the ratio
obtained for the EFC core services. In 1995-6 the proportion of expenditure on these
services was 24.14 percent and in 1999-2000 the ratio stood at 25.7 percent (Table
4.1).
Local Public Goods (extended)
The definition of Local Public Goods was  extended to include Education,
Sanitation, Fire Brigade, Water, Roads and Street Lighting. With this extended
definition the ratio of expenditure on these services is higher at 46.02 percent in 1995-
6 (Table 4.1). The trend pattern continues to remain the same as was observed with
the other two definitions. In 1999-2000 the proportion stands at 48.65 percent. 19
General Administration, Salaries etc
Expenditures on general administration and salaries are an essential part of
the expenses being incurred by all ULBs. However, burgeoning expenses on this head
implies that less remains for spending on public goods. Of the expenditure categories,
the highest proportion of expenditure was incurred on general administration,
pensions etc. (Table 4.1). It comprised as much as 40.16 percent of total expenditure
in 1995-6. It does, however, show a gradually declining trend. It fluctuated by about
one percentage point over the next four years and stood at 37.93 percent in 1999-
2000. With larger expenditures on this front being at the expense of public goods
provision, any effort to reduce expenditures on general administration and salaries is
seen to be an indicator of improvement in performance.
Disaggregated Look at Expenditure Categories
In the sub-section we now look at some of the important expenditure
categories for MCs. While some of these categories may have been encountered
earlier, we now look at them individually.
Education, Libraries etc.
Education is a public good. Hence, higher the expenditure on education, the
better the performance. The proportion of expenditure on  education, free reading
halls etc. has steadily declined from 4.29 percent in 1995-6 to 3.45 percent in 1998-9
(Table 4.1). In 1999-2000 there has been a marginal increase to 3.86 percent in 1999-
2000.
Sanitation, Solid Waste Management etc.
Expenditure on sanitation, solid waste management etc which stood at 12.07
percent in 1995-6, rose to 14.29 percent in 1996-7 (Table 4.1). Subsequently for the
next two years a declining trend was noticed and it fell to 12.9 percent in 1998-9. In
1999-2000 the ratio rose to 13.69 percent. 20
Fire Brigade
Expenditure on  fire brigade, which comprised 0.61 percent of total
expenditure in 1995-6, fell to 0.51 percent in 1996-7 but again picked up to 0.57
percent in 1997-8 (Table 4.1). In 1998-9 it once again showed a decline by 0.10
percentage point to 0.47 percent, but picked up by 0.11 percentage point in 1999-2000
to reach 0.58 percent.
Water Supply
Expenditure on Water Supply as percent of total expenditure comprised 12.34
percent in 1995-6 (Table 4.1). It has shown a steady increase to reach 14.12 percent in
1998-9. In 1999-2000 there has been a marginal decline to 14.06 percent.
Epidemics and Public Health
Expenditure on epidemics and public health as percent of total expenditure
comprised 5.25 percent in 1995-6. It has fluctuated around the
5 percent mark in the following four years and stood at 5.04 percent in
1999-2000.
Roads
Expenditure on Roads comprised 8.61 of total expenditure in 1995-6. A very
gradual increase resulted in its proportion going up to 9.04 percent in 1998-9. In
1999-2000 it declined marginally to stand at 8.81 percent.
Street Lighting
Expenditure on street lighting does not command a large proportion of total
expenditure. It was 2.85 percent in 1995-6, which has fallen to 2.62 percent in 1999-
2000.
Growth Rates of Expenditure Categories
The exercise in the previous sub-sections was concerned with examining
various heads of expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures. This indicated the 21
relative importance being given to the various heads in the levels of expenditures
being incurred. In this section we look at the way in which various heads of
expenditures have grown over time. We look at this in the context of nominal (that is
uncorrected for inflation) expenditures.  Growth rates  were computed for all
expenditure categories for all MCs.
In 1996-7 the highest growth rate was recorded by expenditure on sanitation
and solid waste management of 46.04 percent (Table 4.2).
TABLE 4.2
GROWTH RATE OF EXPENDITURE HEADS
(%)
1996 – 7 1997 - 8 1998 – 9 1999 – 2000
General Administration, Salaries,
Pension and Pensionary Benefits etc 14.05 19.04 11.92 14.69
Education, Libraries,
Free Reading Halls etc.
15.53 12.64 2.40 24.52
Sanitation, Solid Waste
Management and Drain,
Mechanical and Electrical etc
46.04 12.01 8.19 18.20
Fire Brigade 3.50 27.89 (3.97) 38.50
Water Supply 28.34 20.46 22.60 10.88
Epidemics and Public Health 15.33 18.66 11.15 16.28
Roads 23.86 14.66 22.51 8.51
Street Lighting 27.27 2.66 19.37 8.59
Total Expenditure 23.40 14.28 17.46 11.37
The next highest growth rate of 28.34 percent was recorded by water supply.
Street lighting too did not fare too badly and registered a growth rate of about 27
percent. Expenditure on roads recorded 23.86 percent. The lowest growth rate of 3.50
percent was recorded for expenditure on fire brigades. This was followed by 14.05
percent rate of growth for general administration, salaries etc. which seemed to
suggest that MCs as a whole seemed to be aware that administration and salaries
needed to be de-emphasized. Education, libraries etc seemed, however, to have taken
a back seat with a growth rate of only 15.53 percent being registered. 22
In the very next year 1996-7, the growth rate of expenditure on administration
and salaries picked up to 19.04 percent, that is an increase of about 6 percentage
points. Expenditure on education, libraries etc. further fell to 12.64 percent. The
sharpest fall was registered by the expenditure on sanitation and solid waste
management, a fall of 34 percentage points. The growth rate of expenditure on
streetlights registered a fall of about 25 percentage points. The growth rate of
expenditure on water supply fell to 20.46 percent and that of roads to 14.66 percent.
Growth rate of expenditure on epidemics and public health increased by about 3
percentage points and that of fire brigades by 25 percentage points. Growth rate of
total expenditures declined from 23.4 percent in 1996-7 to 14.28 percent in 1997-8.
1998-9 saw a drop in the growth rates of general administration and salaries
by 7.5 percentage points, education and libraries by 10 percentage points, sanitation
and solid waste by 24 percentage points, epidemics and public health by 7.5
percentage points. Growth rates of expenditures on water supply have risen by about 2
percentage points, roads by 8 percentage points and street lighting by about 17
percentage points. Growth rate of total expenditures showed an increase of about 3
percentage points.
In 1999-2000, the highest growth rate has been recorded by fire brigades, that
is 38.5 percentage points. Education and libraries too have fared very well with a
growth rate of 24.5 percent. The growth rate of expenditure on salaries has increased
to 14.69 percent, that of sanitation to 18.2 percent and on epidemics and public health
to 16.28 percent. Growth rate of expenditure on water supply has halved to 10.88
percent and that on roads has fallen by 14 percentage points and that on streetlights by
11 percentage points. Growth rate of total expenditures has fallen by 6 percentage
points.
A Detailed Look at Municipal Corporations
Having looked at the overall picture of the expedniture pattern of MCs, we
know seek to take a detailed look. The detailing will be in terms of examing specific
expenditure heads. 23
Maharashtra, is a highly urbanized State, and within the urban population of
Maharashtra, the majority is from a selected few towns, declared as MCs by the State
Government. This makes MCS a distinguished set of ULBs. In this section we look
more closely at the financial position for this set of ULBs for the period 1995-6 to
1998-9. The reason for excluding the year 1999-2000 in this section is that for this
year the expenditure figures for BMC were available only in a provisional form. This
lack of precision in the data for BMC was found to be distorting our evaluation.
In 1995-6 the total number of MCs in the State was 12.  In the year 1997-8,
Ulhasnagar and Nanded-Waghala were added and in 1998-9 Sangli-Miraj-Koopwad
was added. Very recently, the State Government has announced the conversion of
seven, ‘A’ class municipal councils into MCs, making a total figure of 22. However,
for our analysis we work with only 15 MCs that existed in 1998-9.
The 15 MCs in Maharshtra are heterogeneous in many respects, such as
population, geographical area, civic facilities provided by them etc. (Note that we are
not considering the 7 proposed MCs in our discussion here). Hence, for assessing the
general revenue and expenditure pattern of MCs in Maharashtra, the following three
different scenarios have been created:
￿  Scenario (A) : Considering 15 MCs together
￿  Scenario (B) : Considering only 14 MCs, that is excluding BMC
￿  Scenario (C) : Considering only 12 MCs, that is excluding BMC, Pune
and Nagpur
An interesting aspect of the finances of the MCs needs to be pointed out
before we proceed to the detailed examination. The Municipal Acts stipulate that
ULBs must balance their budgets. However, in spite of this stipulation we find that
MCs are running up deficits. Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 make this amply clear. 24
TABLE 4.3
   PATTERNS OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE (SCENARIO A)
               (Rs Crores)
Financial Year Total Income from all
Sources Total Expenditure Surplus/ (Deficit)
1995-6 3226.44 3092.69 133.76
1996-7 3703.81 3806.56 (102.76)
1997-8 4189.69 4426.84 (237.15)
1998-9 4958.47 5208.70 (250.24)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate deficit
TABLE 4.4
  PATTERNS OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE  (SCENARIO B)
                                                      (Rs Crores)
Financial Year
Total Income from
all Sources Total Expenditure Surplus/ (Deficit)
1995-6 1198.51 1038.70 159.81
1996-7 1350.44 1307.79 42.64
1997-8 1621.68 1486.58 135.10
1998-9 1825.27 1886.46 (61.19)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate deficit
TABLE 4.5
  PATTERNS OF INCOME AND EXPENDITURE (SCENARIO C)
                         (Rs Crores)
Financial Year Total Income from
all Sources Total Expenditure Surplus/ (Deficit)
1995-6 786.91 643.16 143.75
1996-7 888.61 842.30 46.31
1997-8 1097.34 1014.65 82.69
1998-9 1228.98 1247.36 (18.38)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate deficit
 
  The following inferences may be drawn from the three tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5:
￿  As per Scenario A,  BMC has been consistently running large deficits
throughout the period, since deficits vanish dramatically in Scenario B and
C (For more details on BMC finances the interested reader is referred to
Karnik 2002). 25
￿  The financial size of all other MCs together is less than one third the
financial size of BMC.
￿  Year 1998-9 seems to be a bad year for all the MCs.
￿  1997-8 was comparatively better than the previous year, the reasons for
which would become clear in due course.
Overall Expenditure Pattern in MCs of Maharashtra
The overall expenditure pattern of MCs in Maharashtra can be summarized in
Table 4.6.
  TABLE 4.6
  EXPENDITURE PATTERN OF MCs IN MAHARASHTRA
 
(%)









A 38.32 3.94 13.36 12.92 5.04 8.77 2.79 14.86 100.00
B 17.72 6.80 9.40 18.96 4.20 8.86 4.55 29.51 100.00
C 13.92 8.53 10.88 17.95 5.77 11.52 5.42 26.01 100.00
The following observations may be made:
￿  Except for BMC, the administrative costs of all other MCs are in the range of
13.00 percent to 18.00 percent. This again, confirms the general observation that
the BMC is spending much more on salaries.
￿  Smaller MCs are spending more on education, water supply, roads and street
lights, which are priority areas of civic services.
￿  Pune and Nagpur seem to be spending less on sanitation, sewerage and solid
waste management and comparatively more on water supply.
￿  As we go from larger to smaller ULBs across the scenarios, the proportion of
expenditure on education increases, indicating that the smaller MCs are spending
more on education. 26
￿  Expenditure on roads and street lights for smaller cities is a sizable proportion
of the total expenditure, which is a healthy sign in infrastructure development.
Per Capita Expenditure on Civic Services by MCs in Maharashtra
Apart from above, some other observations can be made from the analysis of
per capita expenditure by various MCs on civic services. The analysis is tabulated in
Table 4.7.
  TABLE 4.7
  PER CAPITA EXPENDITURES














1995-6 61.83 174.15 162.94 75.77 124.17 41.09 639.95
1996-7 69.39 247.08 199.53 84.89 149.42 50.81 801.12
1997-8 75.92 268.79 268.20 97.84 166.40 50.66 927.81














1995-6 75.58 84.09 176.80 38.98 74.72 41.99 492.16
1996-7 83.34 98.35 205.44 49.36 107.54 53.39 597.42
1997-8 83.85 130.46 251.17 53.86 103.51 54.79 677.64














1995-6 93.01 85.73 150.40 51.52 94.85 49.89 525.40
1996-7 103.86 110.02 188.69 66.29 131.02 62.10 661.98
1997-8 101.35 155.63 241.43 72.50 135.62 64.38 770.91
1998-9 93.88 175.48 282.13 83.65 193.34 80.88 909.36
The following observations can be made from the Table 4.7:
￿  Per capita expenditure on education is more in smaller MCs. This needs to
be appreciated and encouraged. However, bearing in mind the fact that prices have 27
been rising throughout this period, it is likely that in real terms expenditure on
education may have been declining across all ULBs.
￿  Per capita expenditure on water supply is roughly similar for all MCs.
Hence the reasons for scarcity of water in some cities are other than sufficient
level of spending. The reasons for such scarcity may be due to high distribution
costs given the large geographical areas of some MCs. In such cases, higher per
capita expenditure is necessary, though this is not the case as can be observed
from scenario C.
￿  Similar inference can be made regarding per capita spending on roads,
which are more or less, similar for all cities. In large cities, though the
geographical area available for roads is small, the type of roads being constructed
and the higher maintenance costs brings the per capita expenditure on par with
other cities.
￿  Larger cities are definitely spending more for keeping the city clean, that is
on solid waste management, sewerage and sanitation.
￿  Larger cities are also spending more for health facilities. This may be the
reason, why patients from distant places seek admission to public hospitals in
large cities. This would be an inevitable phenomenon, as smaller cities would
never be able to afford expensive medical facilities, particularly when they are not
able to spend on other priority items.
￿  Smaller cities are spending more on street lights than the larger ones, which
is surprising.
￿  It is interesting to note that there is not much of a  wide difference in total
per capita expenditure for providing selected civic services, among the three
scenarios.
4.2. An Examination of Income Patterns of All Municipal Corporations in
Maharashtra
Good governance involves not only adequate provision of services to citizens,
but also generating sufficient revenues to cover the cost of providing these services. In 28
the previous section we have examined the expenditure patterns of all MCs with
respect to various budget heads. In this section we now look at the other side of the
budget and examine the income patterns of MCs.
TABLE 4.8
PERCENTAGE REPRESENTATION OF INCOME HEADS
           (%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-2000
Grants from State Govt./total income 5.09 5.21 4.76 4.80 4.92
Loans / total income 4.75 5.91 6.99 9.83 11.73
Octroi / own income 50.98 49.37 47.79 46.96 47.72
Property Tax / own income 17.91 19.17 20.81 21.29 21.15
Water Charges/ own income 10.86 13.20 14.55 13.67 13.43
Conservancy and Sanitation / own
income 0.59 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.67
Street Lights / own income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Licence Fees andEntertainment/ own
income 0.77 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.74
Building Rents/own income 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.49
Own Income /total income 90.16 88.87 88.25 85.37 83.35
Table 4.8 presents various sources of income as ratios to total income and own
income. The salient points to emerge are the following:
•  Grants from the State government as a ratio to total income have hovered
around the 5 percent mark between 1995-6 and 1999-2000 (Table 4.8).
•  The share of loans in total income was 4.75 percent in 1995-6. It has risen
steadily to reach 11.73 percent in 1999-2000.
•  Of the own sources of income, the share of octroi has been the highest at 50.98
percent in 1995-6. It has registered a gradual decline and stood at 47.72
percent in 1999-2000 but still comprises the largest share of own income. 29
•  The share of property tax was 17.91 percent in 1995-6. It has rose gradually
and stood at 21.15 percent in 1999-2000.
•  Water charges comprised 10.86 percent of own income in 1995-6. It gradually
rose to 14.55 percent in 1997-8. A declining trend is noticeable since then. In
1999-2000 it comprised 13.43 percent of own income.
•  Conservancy and sanitation  comprized a mere 0.59 percent in 1995-6. It
fluctuated marginally and stood at 0.67 percent in 1999-2000.
•  No income is earned from streetlights.
•  Licence fees and entertainment comprised 0.77 percent of own income. This
showed a steady decline over the next three years to reach 0.62 percent in
1998-9. In 1999-2000, however, there was a marginal increase to 0.74 percent.
•  Building rents comprised 0.59 percent of own income in 1995-6. This declined
marginally to 0.49 percent. It rose by 0.02 percent and formed 0.51 percent in
1997-8 and 1998-9. In 1999-2000 it once again declined marginally to 0.49
percent.
•  Own income as a whole as percent of total income comprised 90.16 percent in
1995-6. This has shown a steady decline and stood at 83.35 percent in 1999-
2000.
Growth Rates of Income Categories
In 1996-7 the highest growth rate of 46.6 percent was registered for loans
(Table 4.9). 30
TABLE 4.9
GROWTH RATES OF INCOME SOURCES
                       (%)
1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-2000
Grants from State Government 20.83 3.48 18.45 17.84
Loans 46.61 33.89 65.50 37.01
Octroi 12.51 8.93 11.74 14.00
Property Tax 24.35 22.19 16.34 11.41
Water Charges 41.19 24.04 6.87 10.17
Conservancy and Sanitation 26.88 15.32 5.78 22.22
Street Lights -- -- -- --
Licence Fees and Entertainment -1.62 9.81 10.72 34.59
Building Rents -3.13 17.48 13.38 8.48
Other Income 4.60 2.78 23.45 8.50
Total Income from Own Sources 16.18 12.54 13.71 12.18
Grand Total Income from all
Sources 17.86 13.33 17.56 14.89
 Grants from state governments grew at a much lower rate of 20.83 percent. Income
from water charges also grew at a high rate of 41.19 percent. Income from
Conservancy and sanitation recorded a growth rate of 26.88 percent and that of
property tax at 24.35 percent. The performance of income from  octroi was not
particularly good. It registered a growth rate of only 12.51 percent. Licence fees and
entertainment and building rents both registered negative growth rates in 1996-7.
Total income from own sources recorded a growth rate of 16.18 percent in 1996-7 and
income from all sources grew at 17.86 percent.
In 1997-8 grants from state governments fell sharply and recorded a growth of
merely 3.48 percent, a fall of 17 percentage points. The growth rate of loans also fell
to 33.89 percent. Income from octroi, property Tax, water charges, conservancy and
sanitation all recorded lower growth rates. However, income from licence fees and
building rents rose from negative to a positive of 9.81 and 17.48 percent, respectively. 31
Total income from own sources registered a lower growth rate of 12.54 percent. Total
income from all sources also grew at a lower rate of 13.33 percent.
In 1998-9 the growth rate of grants from state government shot up to 18.45
percent and that of loans doubled to 65.5 percent. Only income from octroi grew at a
higher rate of 11.74 percent while all other sources of income including property tax,
water charges, conservancy and sanitation, and building rents grew at lower rates than
the previous year. Total income from own sources and total income from all sources
grew at higher rates of 13.71 and 17.56 percent, respectively.
In 1999-2000 the growth rate of grants from state government was marginally
lower rate of 17.84 percent. The growth rate of income from loans was lower by 28
percentage points, property taxes and building rents by 5 percentage points. The
growth rate for income from octroi was about 2 percent higher and that from water
charges about 3 percent more. The income from conservancy and sanitation and
licence fees and entertainment grew at high rates of 22 .22 and 34.59 percent. Total
income from own sources grew at a marginally lower rate of 12.18 percent, lower by
1.5 percentage points. Total income from all sources grew a 14.89 percent, which was
lower by 2.6 percentage points.
A Detailed Look at Municipal Corporations
Just as we had done for expenditures of MCs, we seek to examine in greater
detail the revenue side of MCs. The detailing is in terms of specific revenue items as
well as commentaries on specific MCs.
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: General Observations
The revenues of MCs comprize those obtained through own sources, such
as property tax, octroi etc., and those available through external sources like grants






  TABLE 4.10
  FOUR AVERAGE INCOME PATTERN OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS










A 5.11 44.30 18.49 8.35 23.75 100.00
B 7.90 49.58 11.47 6.30 24.75 100.00
C 6.78 56.20 13.13 5.93 17.96 100.00
We draw the following inference from Table 4.10.
￿  The share of grants in the total revenues of MCs is limited in the range of 5
percent to 8 percent, indicating the self reliant nature of finances. The share of
octroi in total revenues is observed to be between 44 percent and 57 percent. As a
share of own revenues, octori accounts for 58 percent and  is clearly the major
source of income for the MCs. Property tax contributes about 11 percent to 19
percent and around 6 percent to 8 percent of revenues are received through water
charges.
￿  As we proceed from scenario A to scenario C, we observe, that the
proportion of octroi in the overall income pattern increases, while that of water
charges diminishes. This not only indicates that the smaller MCs are more reliant
on octroi, but also indicates that effective steps are necessary regarding water
charges in smaller cities. The steps can be in two directions, viz., widening the
source base and improving recoveries. We would comment about this while
assessing the income - expenditure pattern about water supply.
￿  Pune and Nagpur has received comparatively more grants from the State
than other MCs, during the period under consideration.
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: Loans
Apart from above, the role of loans in overall income pattern of all MCs, that
is in scenario A, also provide some interesting insights. The share of loans in the 33
revenues has been increasing steadily from 4.80 percent (1995-6) to 10.15  percent
(1998-9). See Table 4.11.
  TABLE 4.11








1995-6 5.14 4.80 46.45 90.06
1996-7 5.41 6.13 45.52 88.46
1997-8 4.95 7.26 43.83 87.79
1998-9 4.95 10.15 41.39 84.89
Average 5.11 7.08 44.30 87.80
  It can be observed that with the average share of the grants remaining almost
constant at roughly 5 percent and the share of loans increasing steadily, the share of
revenues from own sources, particularly octroi, has diminished, indicating an inverse
correlation between the two income sources. Similar behavior is observed in other
scenarios. It is not clear if revenues from octroi shrink in anticiaption of loans or
whether loans are taken as a gap-filling measure due to insufficient collection from
octroi. Both situations are equally plausible. However, this needs detailed scrutiny, or
perhaps, self assessment by the MCs.
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: Grants from the State
It can also be observed that the pattern of funds flowing from the State by
way of grants has been varying widely. Such varying growth rates are summarized in
Table 4.12. 34
TABLE 4.12
  GROWTH RATES OF GRANTS DISBURSED TO MCs
 
(%)









1996-7 54.22 (8.95) 20.83 (19.87) (4.29) 9.32 (1.96) (19.83) (11.02)
1997-8 (4.74) 15.91 3.48 45.31 8.15 18.75 42.30 18.59 31.47
1998-9 (11.44) 55.57 18.45 (25.18) 55.54 27.38 (27.99) 78.43 15.86
Note: Bracketed figures indicate negative growth rates
 
  The disbursement of grants from the State appears to be totally unpredictable
with even negative growth rates being observed. Such unpredictable behviour is more
or less equally spread over all scenarios, that is all MCs, and further, to both types of
grants, that is plan and non plan. With such arbitrary nature regarding receivable from
the State, it is difficult for any ULB, not only to formulate developmental activities,
but even to formulate their annual budgets.
It is also worth estimating the proportion of grants received from the State by
all the MCs, with the revenue receipts of the State. Table 4.13 gives these details.
  TABLE 4.13
  DEVOLUTION TO MCs IN MAHARASHTRA BY THE STATE
         (Rs.
crore)





1995-6 13,710.00 165.80 1.21
1996-7 15,470.00 200.33 1.29
1997-8 17,363.00 207.31 1.19
1998-9 17,776.00 245.56 1.38
Average 1.27
*While calculating the revenue receipts of the State, as per the verbatim provisions of
the Article 243I and 243Y, only the net proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls and fees
levied by the State are considered and all other revenues like grants from the central
government, share in central taxes in lieu of recommendations of the Central Finance
Commissions etc. are excluded. 35
  It can be observed that, on an average, the State has been sharing only 1.27
percent of the revenues with MCs, which constitute about 75 percent of the urban
population. Needless to mention, this pattern needs to be changed.
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: Octroi
Growth rates for octroi in overall income indicates a diminishing trend. This is
more prominent for smaller MCs, especially since smaller MCs are more dependent
on octroi. Table 4.14 summarizes the observations in this respect.
TABLE 4.14
  GROWTH RATES OF INCOME FROM OCTROI
 
(%)
Financial Year Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
1996-7 12.51 18.68 19.17
1997-8 8.93 14.56 16.28
1998-9 11.74 6.05 4.25
  If octroi is the main source of revenue for the smaller towns, then the situation
is alarming for their fiscal health, particularly, if it is seen against the backdrop of
unpredictable nature of funds flowing from the State. Year 1998-9 seems to be
especially bad and the reasons for this can be due to the omnipresent economic
recession in all sectors of the economy.
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: Property Tax
  Followed by octroi, property tax is the next significant source of revenues for
MCs. Table 4.15 describes the pattern for all scenarios.
  TABLE 4.15











A 9.38 57.83 34.90
B 10.68 50.28 40.03
C 14.40 46.05 34.14 36
It can be observed that the increase in number of properties is more for the
smaller MCs, resulting in widening of the tax base, but simultaneously, since the
efficiency in recovering property tax diminishes, the advantage for revenues gets
nullified. Pune and Nagpur could have monitored the recoveries from arrears more
effectively, as being indicated from scenario B. Both, the total recovery position and
the recoveries from arrears, can clearly be improved in all MCs, which would help in
enhancement of their revenues. This, perhaps, could be complemented by initiatives
from the State regarding delegating more autonomy about fixing the tax rates, as also,
with the initiatives regarding changing over the tax base towards some source other
than the annual rental value.
It is also worth further scrutinizing the growth in number of properties, and its
relation with the increase in demand for property tax and recoveries from the current
demand. Table 4.16 does so.
TABLE 4.16
   GROWTH IN NUMBER OF PROPERTIES, DEMAND AND RECOVERY
FROM CURRENT DEMAND OF PROPERTY TAX
  (%)
Scenario A
  Financial Year




1996-7 5.06 24.00 67.67
1997-8 15.30 21.76 69.68
1998-9 7.77 20.06 69.22
Scenario B
  Financial Year
  Number of
Properties Demand Recovery from
Current Demand (%)
1996-7 5.79 14.85 53.90
1997-8 17.66 34.63 60.44
1998-9 8.60 13.59 60.73
Scenario C
  Financial Year
  Number of
Properties Demand Recovery from
Current Demand (%)
1996-7 6.97 19.53 51.00
1997-8 26.43 38.15 59.66
1998-9 9.79 16.64 58.19 37
  The following inferences can be drawn from Table 4.16:
￿  The year 1997-8 was a flourishing year for the real estate sector, even though
many other sectors of economy were entering into a phase of recession. This
aspect of the real estate market is reflected in the abnormal increase in the number
of properties and the increase in demand for tax. But the real estate market seems
to have flourished relatively more in smaller towns than in large cities like
Mumbai. This also supports a general conclusion about the growth of urban sector
in Maharashtra namely that smaller towns are expanding more rapidly than larger
towns. This has been observed in the case of population as well.
 
￿  It is also observed that as number of properties increases, the recovery from
current demand, that is recovering the property tax on the newly created properties
also increases, but the larger cities are more effective in this than the smaller ones.
￿  There appears to be some problem with assessment of new properties in Mumbai.
When the growth in number of properties in 1996-7 was observed to be 5.06
percent, the corresponding increase in demand was 24 percent. However, for the
next year, though the number of properties increased by 15.30 percent, or almost
three times than the previous year, the correlating demand increased only by 21.76
percent.
Apart from all above, following general observations are also noted from the
overall data regarding property tax :
￿  In case of BMC, recovery appears to be steadily declining from 64.50 percent
(1995-6) to 56.27 percent (1999-2000).
￿  In case of Navi Mumbai, recovery is only around 35 percent, and it is still lower
for Ulhasnagar, Aurangabad and Nanded-Waghala (around 30 percent).
￿  Thane appears to have steadily raised the recovery of property tax: In the year
1997-8, recovery has been at its maximum, that is 89.68 percent. It has maintained
a recovery rate above 75 percent over the next few years as well. 38
Revenue Pattern of MCs in Maharashtra: Water Charges
Unlike octroi and property tax, water charges can be directly linked to
consumption. Generally taxes are collected for meeting the cost of such services the
benefits of which cannot be calculated on per capita basis. For example, it is not
possible to arrive at the quantitative benefit received from roads and street lights by an
individual user-citizen and accordingly charging the beneficiary. Taxes are tools for
raising such funds which can be spent on providing civic facilities of group
consumption.  Since, providing water stands on a different footings than other civic
amenities in this respect, ideally it is expected that the collection towards water
charges should be sufficient, to at least meet the operations and maintainance cost. To
ensure transperancy regarding self sufficiency of water supply schemes it is, generally
expected that the budgets and accounts of water supply schemes be separate from
general budgets and accounts. However, except for large MCs, such as Mumbai, Pune
etc., water supply is found to be a part of the general budget. In fact, the performance
of Mumbai in collection of water charges has been exemplary. Over the period 1995-6
to 1998-9, the average ratio of ‘Demand created towards water charges to Revenue
Expenditure on Water Supply’ was 134 percent that is the demand created exceeded
revenue expenditure. Since recovery from demand was only 68 percent,the high ratio
of 134 percent ensured that a significant proportion of revenue expenditure (91
percent in this case) was covered by water charges. However, considering total
expenditure (revenue plus capital) on water supply recoveries covered only 59 percent
over this period. The cost effectiveness of water supply schemes in MCs can be seen
in Table 4.17.
TABLE 4.17










A 93.43 68.05 63.71
B 55.23 68.13 37.65
C 58.38 61.46 35.86 39
It can be observed that in case of smaller MCs the demand created is not
sufficient to cover expenditure.  Further, since the efficiencies regarding recoveries
are lower than those for larger cities, only around 35 percent of the expenditure is
recovered from user charges. The gap has to be subsidized from revenues generated
by other sources, such as octroi and property tax.
Apart from cost effectiveness in supply of water, some other observations
about good and bad cases regarding efficiencies in recoveries were also observed.
They are as follows:
￿  A bad case is that of Navi Mumbai, which has shown a detoriating position, with a
consistent diminishing trend of recoveries from 63.36 percent (1995-6) to 33.80
percent (1999-2000).
￿  The worst case is Ulhasnagar, which recovers only around 37 percent of the
demand generated.
￿  As against this, a good case is Thane, which has maintained recovery above 85
percent in 1997-8 and in subsequent years. Prior to this period as well recovery
was satisfactory that is 67.85 percent (1995-6) and 79.27 percent (1996-7).
￿  The best case is Nagpur, which has consistently recovered over 80 percent, and
particularly in 1997-8 there was a record recovery of 92.74 percent.
4.3. An Examination of Expenditure Patterns of All Municipal Councils in
Maharashtra
This section looks at the financial performance of all Municipal Councils in
the state of Maharashtra. This can be done by examining the finances of the Councils
and trying to identify patterns with respect to various expenditure heads. We do this
specifically to isolate expenditures on provision of important services to citizens
within the jurisdiction of the councils.
Core Services as defined by Eleventh Finance Commission 40
With the EFC definition of core services we find that A class councils
performed the best between 1995-6 and 1998-9. In 1995-6 A class councils incurred
36.21 percent of its total expenditure on these services (Table 4.18).
TABLE 4.18
EFC CORE SERVICES
(WATER, STREET LIGHTS, ROADS, SANITATION /TOTAL EXP)
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 36.21 33.73 31.76 30.34 24.60
B class 28.98 29.83 29.50 28.70 31.05
C class 28.63 26.46 26.57 26.32 25.43
Both B and C Class councils were very close with 28.98 percent and 28.63
percent respectively. In 1996-7 there was a decline in the ratios of A and C class
councils and a marginal increase for B class councils. In 1997-8 the ratio for A class
fell further but it continued to do better than the other two categories although the gap
had narrowed significantly. In 1998-9 all three council categories witnessed a
reduction in their ratios. Finally in 1999-2000 B class councils out performed the
other two and A class councils registered the lowest ratio of 24.6 percent.
Local Public Goods
With this definition of public goods, which excludes water supply but includes
fire brigades, the proportions of expenditure are much smaller than those obtained
with the EFC definition. With this definition too A class continues to be the best
between 1995-6 and 1998-9 and C continues to be the worst between 1995-6 and
1997-8 (Table 4.19). 41
TABLE 4.19
LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD
SANITATION, FIRE BRIGADE, ROADS, ST. LIGHTING/TOTAL EXP
           (%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 23.43 21.98 21.86 20.30 17.25
B class 17.32 18.13 18.20 17.20 16.21
C class 18.52 16.48 17.11 18.49 18.21
In 1998-9 the relative ranking of B class and C class councils differ. With the
EFC definition, C class had the lowest ratio, but with this definition, it is B class with
the lowest ratio. In 1999-2000 too the relative rankings differ from the EFC
definition. By this definition A class has the lowest ratio while B class had the highest
ratio as per the EFC definition.
Local Public Goods (extended)
The extended definition of Local Public Goods comprises education,
sanitation, fire brigade, water, roads and street lighting. With this extended definition
too A class continues to be the best between 1995-6 and 1998-9 and C continues to be
the worst as was observed with the EFC definition (Table 4.20).
TABLE 4.20
LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD (EXTENDED)
EDUCATION, SANITATION, FIRE BRIGADE, WATER, HEALTH, ROADS,
ST. LIGHTING/TOTAL EXP
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 45.37 42.30 42.11 37.79 36.18
B class 40.43 41.53 40.23 38.74 41.11
C class 38.63 37.89 37.21 36.24 36.28
Also in 1999-2000 we find B class to be the best performer and A class the
worst as was observed with the EFC definition. 42
General Administration, Salaries etc.
As mentioned in case of the discussion on corporations, expenditures on
general administration and salaries are incurred only at the cost of public goods
provision. Hence, those councils that incur the lowest amount of expenditure on this
category of expenditure are seen to be the best performers. In each of the years
between 1995-6 and 1999-2000 A class councils have been the best performers with
the lowest proportion of total expenditures of being incurred on general
administration and salaries (Table 4.21).
TABLE 4.21
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION, SALARIES, PENSION and PENSIONARY
BENEFITS ETC/TOTAL EXP
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 29.85 30.49 28.43 27.84 25.23
B class 34.12 32.72 31.81 31.14 30.79
C class 33.83 35.24 36.25 32.41 33.09
Not only have the A class councils outperformed the other categories but they
have also bettered their own performance by reducing the proportion of their
expenditure going to general administration and salaries from 29.85 in 1995-6 and
30.39 percent in 1996-7 to 25.23 percent in 1999-2000. Although C class councils
performed better than B class in 1995-6, since 1996-7 B class councils have
consistently fared better than C class. Thus C class councils have been the worst
performers since 1996-7.
Education, Libraries etc.
In 1995-6 B class councils fared the best with the largest proportion
(9.25 percent) of total expenditure being spent on education (Table 4.22). 43
TABLE 4.22
EDUCATION, LIBRARIES, FREE READING
HALLS ETC./TOTAL EXPENDITURE
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 6.69 6.47 6.34 5.65 10.17
B class 9.25 9.20 8.19 7.89 8.10
C class 8.20 9.68 8.84 8.08 8.87
A class councils performed the worst with the lowest proportion of 6.69
percent. In 1996-7 while A class councils continued to fare the worst, the expenditure
proportion of C class councils just marginally surpassed that of B class. In 1997-8 and
1998-9 the relative positions of the three council categories remained unchanged with
C, B and A in that order. In 1999-2000 A class councils, which had been the worst
performers suddenly, outperformed the others by incurring 10.17 percent of total
expenditures on education. B and C class followed in that order with 8.87 percent and
8.10 percent.
Sanitation, Solid Waste Management etc.
On this front A class councils have consistently performed the best although
its own performance has deteriorated (Table 4.23).
TABLE 4.23
SANITATION, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ETC/TOTAL EXP
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 8.82 7.68 7.67 7.13 5.92
B class 5.08 4.73 4.78 5.16 4.90
C class 6.91 5.58 5.92 5.91 5.81
While 8.82 percent of total expenditures were being incurred on sanitation and
solid waste management in 1995-6, its proportion stood at 5.92 percent in 1999-2000. 44
Also it is seen that B class councils have all through been the worst performers. Thus
relative positioning of the three categories of councils on this front has remained
unchanged between 1995-6 and 1999-2000.
Fire Brigade
In 1995-6 C class councils incurred the largest proportion of expenditure on




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.24 0.18
B class 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.38 0.38
C class 0.47 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.31
A Class councils incurred the lowest proportion of 0.24 percent. Between
1996-7 and 1999-2000 B class councils have recorded the largest ratios while A class
councils have continued to register the lowest ratios.
Water Supply
In 1995-6 A class councils have continued to incur the highest expenditures on





1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 13.02 12.01 10.21 10.28 7.53
B class 12.10 12.22 11.82 11.88 15.22
C class 10.58 10.29 9.80 8.15 7.52
Since 1996-7, however, the proportion of expenditure on water supply has
been the highest for B class councils. C class councils have consistently remained in
third position. 45
Epidemics and Public Health
In 1995-6 A class councils were the best performers with the highest ratio of
2.23 percent and C class the worst with 1.33 percent (Table 4.26).
TABLE 4.26
EPIDEMICS and PUBLIC HEALTH /TOTAL EXP
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 2.23 1.84 3.70 1.56 1.23
B class 1.75 1.99 2.02 1.77 1.57
C class 1.33 1.43 1.46 1.52 1.67
In 1996-7 B class councils outperformed A class, while C class continued to
fare the worst. In 1997-8 once again A class councils reverted to being on top of the
list with 3.7 percent, B class councils followed with 2.02 percent and C class with
1.46 percent. In 1998-9 while C class councils continued to remain at the bottom of
the list, the first position was again that of B class. In 1999-2000 there was a complete
turnaround with C class, the worst performers so far, topping the list with a ratio of
1.67 percent.  A class councils fared the worst in 1999-2000 with a ratio of 1.23
percent.
Roads
In 1995-6 and 1996-7 A class councils have fared the best with the largest




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 10.03 9.81 9.08 8.32 7.85
B class 8.57 8.90 9.34 7.88 7.45
C class 8.43 8.01 7.74 9.26 9.15
C class councils have been the worst performers in both the years. In 1997-8 B
class councils outperformed the other two while C class continued to remain at the 46
bottom. In 1998-9 and 1999-2000, C class, the worst performers so far, surpassed the
performance of the other two and B class fared the worst.
Street Lighting
A class councils have consistently fared the best and recorded the highest




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 4.35 4.22 4.81 4.60 3.30
B class 3.22 3.98 3.56 3.77 3.48
C class 2.71 2.58 3.10 3.00 2.94
C class councils have recorded the lowest ratios in each of the years. Hence
relative rankings of the three council categories have remained unchanged between
1995-6 and 1999-2000.
Growth Rates of Expenditure Categories
The exercise in the previous sub-sections was concerned with examining
various heads of expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures. This indicated the
relative importance being given to the various heads in the levels of expenditures
being incurred. In this section we look at the way in which various heads of
expenditures have grown over time. We look at this in the context of nominal (that is
uncorrected for inflation) expenditures.  Growth rates  were computed for all
expenditure categories for all three levels of municipal councils A, B and C (See
Table 4.29). 47
TABLE 4.29
GROWTH RATES OF EXPENDITURE HEADS
(%)
1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION, SALARIES, PENSIONS ETC.
A class 15.97 11.82 9.63 10.06
B class 13.60 11.54 10.12 9.07
C class 12.75 13.78 8.60 10.51
EDUCATION, LIBRARIES, FREE READING HALLS ETC.
A class 9.72 17.51 -0.22 118.65
B class 17.85 2.08 8.37 13.29
C class 27.87 0.93 11.04 18.87
SANITATION, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ETC
A class -1.08 19.71 4.11 0.81
B class 10.29 15.82 21.52 4.61
C class -12.59 17.39 21.18 6.50
FIRE BRIGADE
A class 27.01 37.29 -10.37 -10.72
B class 36.21 17.48 -17.54 10.20
C class -27.82 22.47 13.51 3.39
WATER SUPPLY
A class 4.80 1.86 12.80 -11.02
B class 19.61 11.01 13.00 41.33
C class 5.26 5.38 1.01 -0.13
EPIDEMICS and PUBLIC HEALTH
A class -6.38 141.51 -52.96 -3.93
B class 34.42 16.94 -1.82 -2.08
C class 17.02 12.30 27.01 18.94
ROADS
A class 11.09 10.96 2.61 14.52
B class 23.01 20.34 -5.06 4.33
C class 2.87 6.86 45.38 6.90
1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
STREET LIGHTING
A class 10.14 36.68 7.18 -12.95
B class 46.32 2.58 19.16 1.87
C class 2.99 33.20 17.38 6.23
TOTAL EXPENDITURE
A class 13.53 19.91 11.96 21.44
B class 18.47 14.72 12.47 10.31
C class 8.24 10.62 21.48 8.23 48
4.4. An Examination of Income Patterns of All Municipal Councils
In this section we now look at the other side of the budget and examine the
income patterns of Municipal Councils.
Grants
The share of grants in total income has been the largest for C class councils




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 16.00 15.70 17.24 19.49 52.14
B class 29.40 26.94 28.36 30.16 58.83
C class 36.98 35.62 38.15 39.67 63.21
For each of the council categories we observe that the share of grants in total
income declined in 1996-7. Since then the share of grants for each of the council
categories has shown an increasing trend. The year 1999-2000 has witnessed a sharp
increase in the share of grants for each of the council categories. The increase has
been of the order of 23.5 percentage points for C class, 28.67 percentage points for B
class and of 32.65 percentage points for A class councils. Thus A class councils have
registered the largest increase in their share of grants in 1999-2000.
Loans
The share of loans in total income has been the largest for A class councils and




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 3.18 3.89 9.30 4.90 12.77
B class 2.31 1.04 2.11 0.98 1.19
C class 3.01 2.43 2.11 1.81 1.2349
The share of the loan component for A class councils in their total income
shows an increasing trend while the share of loans in their total income for B class
councils shows a declining trend. A declining trend is also noticed for C class
councils.
Own Income
The share of own income in total income is seen to be the largest for A class





1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 80.82 80.41 73.47 75.61 35.09
B class 68.29 72.02 69.53 68.86 39.98
C class 60.01 61.95 59.74 58.52 35.57
Between these years the share of own income for A class councils is seen to
decline steadily from 80.82 percent in 1995-6 to 75.61 percent in 1998-9. C class
councils registered slight increase in the ratio in 1996-7 but since then a steady
decline is observed for them too.
In the last year 1999-2000 a sharp decline in the share of own income is
registered for all categories of councils. A 40.5 percentage point reduction is seen for
A class councils, 28.41 percentage point decline for B class councils and 22.95
percentage point reduction occurs for C class councils. In this year A class councils,
which had so far had the largest share of, own income slips to third position with B
class councils recording the largest ratio of 39.98 percent.
Octroi
The share of Octroi in own income has been the largest for A class councils in




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 62.83 65.91 64.41 59.78 8.80
B class 52.61 53.13 51.83 50.99 8.03
C class 50.80 51.46 53.33 50.94 8.36
C class councils recorded the lowest share in 1995-6 and 1996-7. Since then
its performance has been marginally better than B class councils.
In the year 1999-2000 a sharp decline was registered for all council categories.
A 50.58 percentage point reduction is recorded for A class councils, 42.96 percentage
point fall for B class councils and 42.58 percentage point drop for C class councils.
Property Tax
A class councils have consistently been the worst performers on this count
with the lowest share from property tax in own income although its own performance




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 9.07 8.85 10.07 9.95 20.98
B class 12.79 13.35 13.45 13.57 27.88
C class 12.32 12.30 12.33 12.38 22.74
B councils have fared the best in each of the years and its own performance
too has steadily improved from the share of property tax in own income increasing
from 12.79 percent in 1995-6 to 27.88 percent in 1999-2000.
Water Charges
The share of water charges in own income has bee the highest in C class
councils and the lowest in A class councils in each of the years between 1995-6 and




1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 3.68 3.44 3.94 4.22 9.05
B class 5.19 5.21 5.45 7.48 16.00
C class 5.87 5.60 5.80 7.14 16.66
Both A and C class councils registered a marginal decline in this share in
1996-7 but since then a gradual and steady increase has been observed. B class
councils have shown a steady increase in their income from this source. The largest
increase of income from water charges for each of the council categories has been
observed in 1999-2000. A class councils recorded an increase of 4.83 percentage
points, B class councils 8.52 percentage points and C class councils registered the
largest increase of 9.52 percentage points.
Conservancy and Sanitation
The share of own income conservancy and sanitation was the highest for B
class councils in each of the years except 1998-9 (Table 4.36).
TABLE 4.36
CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION/ OWN INCOME
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.46 0.38
B class 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.67
C class 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.63 0.45
In that year the share of C class councils was seen to be higher than that of B
class councils. The share of A class councils has been the lowest in each of the years.
Street Lights
All three council categories earned a very small proportion of their own
income from street lights. In each of the years the largest share of own income from
street lighting has been that of B class councils (Table 4.37). 52
TABLE 4.37
STREET LIGHTS/ OWN INCOME
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 0.0000 0.00004 0.0001 0.0017 0.0001
B class 0.0035 0.0017 0.0372 0.0032 0.0109
C class 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000
Licence Fees and Entertainment
The share of licence fees and entertainment in own income has been below the
1 percent mark for both A and B class councils in all years except 1999-2000 (Table
4.38).
TABLE 4.38
LICENCE FEES AND ENTERTAINMENT/ OWN INCOME
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.65 1.43
B class 0.68 0.59 0.70 0.68 1.42
C class 0.92 0.95 1.20 1.05 1.76
The largest share of own income from Licence fees and entertainment has
been earned by C class councils in each of the years. Its share was close to the 1
percent mark in 1995-6 and 1996-7. Since then it has exceed 1 percent and in 1999-
2000 it stood at 1.76 percent.
Building Rents
The largest share of own income from Building Rents has been that of C class
councils in each of the years (Table 4.39). 
TABLE 4.39
BUILDING RENTS/ OWN INCOME
(%)
1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00
A class 1.05 1.22 1.51 1.15 2.43
B class 2.68 2.50 2.49 2.47 4.47
C class 3.56 3.60 3.47 3.20 5.67 53
 The lowest share has been that of A class councils. In 1998-9 all three council
categories registered a marginal decline in their shares and in 1999-2000 all three
experienced their largest increase. The share of A class councils increased by 1.28
percentage points, B class councils by 2 percentage points and C class councils by
2.47 percentage points.
Growth Rates of Income Categories
The previous section looked at the relative importance of various income
categories in either total income or on own income. Here we present in table form
(Table 4.40) the growth rates of various income categories.
TABLE 4.40
GROWTH RATES OF INCOME SOURCES
        ( %)
GRANTS FROM STATE GOVERNMENT
A class 1.26 33.58 26.20 222.15
B class -0.35 23.08 19.38 111.53
C class 6.43 24.88 22.44 77.95
LOANS
A class 26.00 191.07 -41.16 213.78
B class -51.25 138.32 -47.96 31.94
C class -10.79 1.31 0.98 -24.31
OCTROI
A class 7.69 8.63 6.64 -91.78
B class 15.77 10.14 9.39 -90.08
C class 15.57 16.52 10.16 -88.86
PROPERTY TAX
A class 0.11 26.58 13.49 17.79
B class 19.67 13.70 12.17 29.33
C class 13.86 12.76 15.80 24.68
WATER CHARGES
A class -3.91 27.22 23.15 19.71
B class 15.18 18.12 52.55 34.62
C class 8.89 16.53 41.95 58.31
CONSERVANCY AND SANITATION
A class 5.05 -2.39 185.72 -53.98
B class 20.92 16.34 6.79 19.72
C class 15.57 2.55 171.93 -51.21 54
TABLE 4.40 (continued ...)
GROWTH RATES OF INCOME SOURCES
(%)
STREET LIGHTS
A class N.A 150 2850.00 -96.61
B class -44.90 2425.93 -90.32 112.12
C class N.A N.A N.A N.A
LICENCE FEES AND ENTERTAINMENT
A class 5.44 13.28 19.97 23.84
B class -0.99 34.21 8.74 30.96
C class 17.57 42.30 0.77 13.69
BUILDING RENTS
A class 19.88 37.41 -12.17 17.63
B class 7.09 12.14 10.50 13.84
C class 15.40 8.26 6.48 20.31
TOTAL INCOME FROM OWN SOURCES
A class 2.65 11.15 14.90 -44.13
B class 14.65 12.89 11.19 -37.06
C class 14.08 12.44 15.32 -32.11
TOTAL INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES
A class 3.17 21.66 11.63 20.39
B class 8.72 16.94 12.27 8.43
C class 10.50 16.60 17.74 11.69
5. Conclusion
The time has now come to conclude this paper. Some broad observations are
in order to begin with:
•  Sans all rhetoric and political posturing it is incontrovertible that the future of
India is decidedly Urban. This implies that substantively greater resources must be
devolved to the urban sector than has been the case in the past. The needs of urban
infrastructure (even restricted to consideration of basic services we have
considered) are huge and there is an accelerating divergence between the revenues
and expenditures of the ULBs across board. Greater resources must simply be
forthcoming (devolved or raised).
•  To meaningfully operationalize the spirit and letter of 74
th CAA, it is necessary
that ULBs come out with a serious and innovative action plan to increase their 55
resources. There is an obvious limit to the extent of devolution from above. While
we have already said that we cannot go into the detailed discussion of alternative
ways of tapping such resources a mention here would perchance, not be out of
place.
1.  Property tax rationalisation represents a huge avenue of improving the revenue
position of many ULBs. However, given the dearth of reliable information and
the lack of political will, the ULBs will have to (cutting across party lines)
make concerted effort for this potential to be effectively tapped (TISS-UoM,
2001).
2.  Creation of Pooled fund bank like institutional arrangement is the way to go in
an era of market driven economy. Again, regulatory changes will have to be
brought about in the financial sector (especially in the mandate and conduct of
Bank and Fis) for this to materialize (Pethe and Ghodke, 2001).
3.  Getting the ULBs rated and floating of Muni Bonds is another modern method
of raising resources. Efficiency and accountability as well as transparency in
terms of maintaining accounts (in conformity with uniform and  best
established practices) is essential. For this to be successful, there is also a need
for macro level policy initiative by way of facilitating existence of deep, thick
and hence vibrant secondary market in such paper (muni bonds) (Pethe and
Ghodke, 2002).
4.  Making innovative use of land as an asset is very important. FSI banks are
already in existence elsewhere and that experience needs to be put to good use
(Jha and Siddiqui, 2001).
•  These are only some of the ways that one can think of. Again, for details in this
regard interested readers are referred to Karnik et al (2002a).
•  The one thing that needs urgent and serious attention is the data gaps especially
with reference to quality of service delivery as well as the unavailability of dis-
aggregate data on many items. These need to be collected uniformly for all ULBs 56
as a matter of standard practice to facilitate analysis, prognosis, diagnosis and
hence remedial policy recommendations.
Finally, we believe that in this article, we have provided a fairly
comprehensive status report on the different aspects related to – revenue expenditure
patterns – ULBs in Maharashtra. For the purposes of evolving objective criteria for
devolution of funds from centre to the states as well as further down and conducting a
comparative analysis between states, such an exercise is useful as a foundational
building block. Hence, this needs to be replicated across states. This involves a major
exercise especially in terms of major data gaps that we have pointed out in the body of
the text. With hope we sign off.                                                        57
APPENDIX 1
NUMBER OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN MAHARASHTRA
Type of the ULB






1 Mumbai City 0 0 0 0 1 1
2 Mumbai Suburban
3 Thane 4 4 1 0 6 15
4 Raigad 1 1 9 0 0 11
5 Ratnagiri 0 2 2 1 0 5
6 Sindhudurg 0 0 3 0 0 3
Kokan
Total for Kokan Division 5 7 15 1 7 35
7 Nasik 0 2 6 0 2 10
8 Ahemadnagar 0 3 5 1 1 10
9 Nandurbar 0 2 2 0 0 4
10 Dhule 0 2 0 0 1 3
11 Jalgaon 1 4 7 0 1 13
Nasik
Total for Nasik Division 1 13 20 1 5 40
12 Pune 0 4 7 0 2 13
13 Sangli 0 2 2 0 1 5
14 Satara 1 2 5 0 0 8
15 Solapur 1 1 7 0 1 10
16 Kolhapur 1 1 7 0 1 10
Pune
Total for Pune Division 3 10 28 0 5 46                                                                           58      
Type of the ULB






17 Aurangabad 0 1 5 0 1 7
18 Parabhani 1 1 6 0 0 8
19 Hingoli 0 2 1 0 0 3
20 Jalana 1 0 3 0 0 4
21 Nanded 0 1 10 0 1 12
22 Latur 1 1 3 0 0 5
23 Osmanabad 0 1 7 0 0 8
24 Beed 1 3 2 0 0 6
Aurangabad
Total for Aurangabad Division 4 10 37 0 2 53
25 Amaravati 1 2 7 0 1 11
26 Buldhana 0 5 6 0 0 11
27 Yavatmal 1 2 5 0 0 8
28 Akola 0 1 4 0 1 6
29 Vashim 0 2 2 0 0 4
Amaravati
Total for Amaravati Division 2 12 24 0 2 40
30 Nagpur 0 2 8 0 1 11
31 Bhandara 0 2 1 0 0 3
32 Gondia 1 0 1 0 0 2
33 Wardha 1 2 3 0 0 6
34 Chandrapur 1 3 3 0 0 7
35 Gadchiroli 0 1 1 0 0 2
Nagpur
Total for Nagpur Division 3 10 17 0 1 31
GRAND TOTAL FOR
MAHARASHTRA
18 62 141 2 22 245    59
APPENDIX 2
Urban Local Bodies In KOKAN Division Of Maharashtra













































34 Sawantwadi Sindhudurg 6 C
35 Vengurla 60
Urban Local Bodies In NASIK DIVISION Of Maharashtra






















































URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN PUNE DIVISION OF
MAHARASHTRA
























































URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN AURANGABAD DIVISION OF
MAHARASHTRA


































































URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN AMARAVATI DIVISION OF
MAHARASHTRA



















































C 214 Risod 64
URBAN LOCAL BODIES IN NAGPUR DIVISION OF
MAHARASHTRA














226 Bhandara B 227 Tumsar Bhandara 31
C 228 Pauni
















B 244 Gadchiroli Gadchiroli 35 C 245 Desaiganj 65
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